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ABSTRACT 
Can people influence others solely by virtue of shared group membership? To address this and 
related questions, we offer a theory of group-mediated social influence and then test it in a 
standardized collective task setting. The theory capitalizes on uncertainty reduction principles 
found in two longstanding social psychological traditions: social identity theory and status 
characteristics theory. Our primary hypothesis was that in-group members would be more 
influential than out-group members. Results from the experiment indicate that in-group members 
were indeed more influential than out-group members. These findings supported a key derivation 
of our theory, and demonstrated that the integration accounts for phenomena that are not 
addressed by either of the motivating theories.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Social influence in its many forms has been a central focus of research for decades. Building 
from traditions in social psychology, sociologists have developed rigorous, empirically validated 
theories to explain how larger group structures affect events at the levels of individuals, small 
groups and networks.[1] In this vein, we build upon existing theories to help understand how 
group membership determines the emergence of social influence hierarchies. We offer a theory 
of group-mediated social influence and test key implications in an experimental setting.  
 
Theories in structural social psychology generally explain how group or network structures affect 
individual outcomes—self-identities, exchange profits, locations within status hierarchies—as 
social interaction plays out in an interpersonal arena (Lawler, Ridgeway and Markovsky 1993). 
Sometimes individuals are unaware of the source of influence, as when the effects of distal 
changes in a network propagate through its connections and alter opportunity structures. Other 
times individuals may recognize and respond to relatively "macro" factors, such as strengthening 
ties in one's primary group under the perceived threat posed by a real but faceless group of 
outsiders. In either case, theoretically accounting for the impact of non-local factors provides a 
more accurate and complete understanding of the experiences, behaviors and consequences 
transpiring among a focal set of social actors.  
 
The new theory integrates elements and ideas from two long-standing traditions in social 
psychology: self categorization theory and status characteristics theory. The integration permits 
us to examine the effects of status and group membership in collective task settings. Typically 
these settings are small face-to-face groups in which people interact in order to solve a problem. 
Examples range from formal work groups such as business or academic committees to informal 
assemblages such as a group of strangers working to free a stuck car from a snow bank. These 
settings share a common feature: Participants have a strong desire to reach a correct solution. 
Frequently however, there are complexities and ambiguities in the course of reaching this 
solution. Social psychologists have long argued that people is such settings look to one another 
for guidance. In the absence of more explicit knowledge, people readily make inferences about 
one another's task-relevant abilities on the basis of observable characteristics. For example, the 
group of strangers working to free the stuck car may use physical size as a cue to solve the 
problem and so decide to place the smallest member behind the wheel of the car to steer it, and 
the largest members at the rear of the car to push it.  
 
Prior research demonstrates that group memberships and status characteristics both provide 
important informational cues in collective task settings. Our interest is in whether these factors 
interact in predictable ways, and whether existing theories can be integrated in order to better 
understand how group membership and status processes operate jointly.  
 
Although self categorization theory and status characteristics theory share some common areas 
of investigation, to date there has been little overlap between the two. A synthesis would be 
useful because task group members are often differentiated by both group memberships and 
status characteristics. Moreover, because they attend to different factors, self categorization 
theory and status characteristics theory may generate conflicting predictions for such contexts. 
Kalkhoff and Barnum (2000) and Oldmeadow et al. (2003) studied the joint impact of status and 
Current Research in Social Psychology (Vol. 13, No. 3) (Barnum & Markovsky) 
23 
group membership and found that status and group membership did indeed operate jointly. That 
research was an important first step towards integration, but did not offer a theoretical 
mechanism explaining how group membership and status function together. We build on that 
earlier work by developing an integrated theory of the joint effects of group membership and 
status on influence. Our theoretical integration and the new empirical tests are reported below.  
 
SELF CATEGORIZATION THEORY 
 
Self categorization theory is concerned with psychological group formation (Turner 1985). It 
was introduced in the late 1970's, an off-shoot of the social identity theory tradition. Self 
categorization theory emphasizes the cognitive underpinnings of categorization processes 
(Turner 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell 1987). Specifically, the theory 
articulates how the cognitive process of categorization generates certain intra-group behaviors, 
and how categorization affects an evaluator's perceptions of self and others. The central idea of 
the theory is that individuals in salient group contexts act more in terms of their shared group 
identity than in terms of separate personal identities (Turner 1991:155). The theory argues that 
the process of group categorization generates depersonalization—the perceived 
interchangeability of members in terms of prototypical features of the group (Turner 1985). 
When categorization occurs, group members come to see themselves as interchangeable in terms 
of the prototypical features of the group, and they come to perceive out-group members as 
interchangeable rather than as unique individuals. 
 
Self-categorization theory asserts that depersonalization operates in conjunction with an 
uncertainty reduction motive (Hogg and Mullin 1999). The latter idea stems from classic social 
comparison theory (Festinger 1954; Moscovici 1976, 1981; Moscovici and Mungy 1983; Suls 
and Miller 1977; Suls and Wills 1991). However, in contrast to traditional views on uncertainty 
reduction, self categorization theory argues that shared group or category membership is a 
precondition for uncertainty reduction and influence.[2] In essence, the theory asserts that people 
establish confidence in their beliefs and opinions by comparing them to the beliefs and opinions 
held by similar others—psychological in-group members. Consensus with in-group members 
generates confidence and the potentially false belief that perceptions are unbiased and veridical. 
In contrast, disagreement with in-group members generates uncertainty (David and Turner 1996; 
2001). When group membership is salient, depersonalization causes in-group members to appear 
more similar to oneself. Disagreement with in-group members then opens the door to influence 
because it generates uncertainty and the possibility that perceptions may be inaccurate.  
 
STATUS CHARACTERISTICS THEORY 
 
A status characteristic is any property of a person that has two or more levels or states that are 
differentially valued, each having associated with it one or more similarly evaluated expectations 
for behavior. In contemporary society, diffuse status characteristics such as race, gender and 
education have many associated expectations. In contrast, specific status characteristics may 
only be pertinent within the local setting, e.g., "mathematical ability" as the specific 
characteristic associated with a mathematical problem-solving task. Status characteristics theory 
investigates how such characteristics organize interaction and social influence in collective task 
settings by evoking expectations about relative task abilities: higher status members of the group 
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are expected to be more competent. When played-out in series of pair-wise interactions, these 
performance expectations lead to the emergence of differentiated power, prestige and influence 
structures among group members.[3] Relative to lower status members, higher status members 
are thereby advantaged with respect to the group's observable power and prestige order (OPPO). 
That is, relative to lower status actors, those with higher status (i) are given more opportunities to 
make suggestions, (ii) actually offer more suggestions, (iii) have more positively evaluated 
suggestions, and (iv) have more influence over other members' opinions. 
 
The scope conditions of the theory assert that it applies in settings where interactants believe (i) 
it is necessary and legitimate to consider each other's suggestions in attempting to solve a group 
task, and (ii) the task has both correct and incorrect solutions. The theory's five assumptions 
argue the following: (1) Salience: If a status characteristic differentiates members of a task 
setting or if the members perceive it as relevant to the task, then it will be salient. (2) Burden of 
proof: If a status characteristic is salient and has not been disassociated from the task, then the 
actor forms expectations that are consistent with states of the characteristic. (3) Sequencing: 
Given that actors have formed expectations consistent with states of the characteristic, if actors 
enter or exit an ongoing task engagement, then performance expectations generated by status 
information in one encounter are preserved. (4) Combining: If an actor forms expectations for 
task outcomes, then she uses these expectations to infer the task competence of self and others. 
The effects of multiple similarly evaluated status characteristics combine to form aggregated 
expectation sets. In such a set, each additional piece of information has a decreasing proportional 
effect. All else being equal, the effects of specific status characteristics are greater than those of 
diffuse characteristics. (5) Basic expectation assumption: If a person uses expectations to infer 
task competence, then the greater a person's perceived competence, the higher the person's 
position in the group's OPPO. 
 
BRIDGING THE THEORIES 
 
Self categorization theory and status characteristics theory both investigate social influence. 
According to self categorization theory, when disagreements arise, interactants use available 
information on group membership to make quality inferences that favor in-group members. In 
status characteristics theory, interactants resolve disagreements via ability inferences and exert 
influence consonant with the states of status characteristics they possess.  
 
The "evaluation-expectations" branch of status characteristics theory specifies mechanisms that 
generate influence effects, and it is there that we find a concept that may offer a useful point of 
connection between the two traditions: behavioral interaction pattern (Balkwell 1991; Fisek, 
Berger and Norman 1991; Skvoretz and Fararo 1996). The theory explains how interaction 
cycles in newly formed, open interaction task groups produce advantages and disadvantages 
among members (Fisek et al.1991:116). Task-oriented behavior is classified into four categories: 
chances to contribute a suggestion, actual suggestions, and positive or negative reactions. As 
interaction transpires in a task group, these serve as components for "behavior cycles" of 
opportunities, actions and evaluations (Fisek et al.1991:116). A behavioral interchange pattern 
(BIP) is a set of interaction cycles with consistent orderings among actors insofar as who gives 
and receives positive and negative evaluations. 
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Fisek et al. (1991:118) argue that an established BIP classifies behaviors into high and low status 
types—a status typification process. Status typification states are commonly understood via 
relatively concrete dimensions such as "leader-follower," "initiator-reactor," "aggressive-shy." 
They become relevant to high or low task ability states, and thus to success or failure at the 
group task. In short, BIPs connect behavioral cues to task outcomes. Along the way they order 
status and influence patterns in the group. Our problem now is how to forge an analogous 
connection between group membership and influence, because membership is not a behavioral 
cue in the status characteristics theory.  
 
There is much research to validate self categorization theory's claim that in-group disagreements 
facilitate influence. [4] The theory argues that others are perceived as competent insofar as they 
are deemed to be prototypical of the in-group. Moreover, when this is not the case—when people 
do not perceive themselves as similar to the in-group—they may change their self categorization 
to that of the out-group. Over time, the cumulative effect of this process locks-in the general 
expectation that in-group members' suggestions are superior to those of out-group members. This 
would appear to be an inter-group analog of status characteristics theory's behavioral interchange 
pattern. Pressing the analogy further, we might expect that, in conjunction with the emergence of 
in-group favoritism, this inter-group BIP will produce an inter-group status typification state 
analogous to the concept's interpersonal manifestations. 
 
"Group membership" does not satisfy the definition for status characteristics, nor is it necessarily 
relevant to performance expectations. We believe group membership serves as a guidepost that 
provides people with an uncertainty-reducing heuristic. The demands of the task setting induce 
beliefs about in-group members only because, when faced with uncertainty, people adopt a 
strategy that has worked for them in the past: They accept suggestions from in-group members 
whom they perceive as referents.  
 
Formal Connections 
 
This section completes the theoretical bridge by integrating Hogg and Mullin's (1999) 
uncertainty reduction argument into the assumptions of status characteristics theory.[5]  
 
Scope Conditions. The theory applies in task settings that satisfy the following conditions: The 
focal actor (1) perceives each of a number of other actors either as an in-group member or an 
out-group member, (2) believes that he or she is working with at least one partner on a evaluated 
collective task, and (3) uses either group memberships or status characteristics as a cue for 
behavior.  
 
Assumptions. The theory is embodied in five assumptions that form an argument explaining how 
group membership affects influence patterns in collective task settings. As specified in the scope 
conditions, the assumptions apply to a focal actor in the task setting: 
 
Assumption 1. If group membership differentiates members of a task setting, then it is salient. 
 
A salient group membership is available for use as a behavioral cue. This assumption is based on 
research by Hogg and his colleagues (Hogg and Mullin 1999; Mullin and Hogg 1998, 1999; 
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Grieve and Hogg 1999; Hogg and Grieve 1999). In a minimal group setting, Hogg and associates 
found that group membership becomes salient when subjects face uncertain tasks. Hogg and 
Mullin (1999) reasoned that this stems from interactants using group membership as a cue to 
reduce uncertainty. 
 
Assumption 2. If group membership is salient and not explicitly dissociated from the task, 
then a behavioral interchange pattern becomes salient.  
 
Traditional arguments in social identity theory claim that in-group members tend to favor other 
in-group members and disfavor out-group members. We propose that in the task context this 
favoritism will translate into a pattern of performance evaluations, leading to the emergence of a 
BIP. When these opportunity-action-evaluation patterns stabilize into BIPs, they organize 
subsequent interactions including who influences whom in the setting. Webster and Hysom 
(1998) argue that BIPs can affect behavior even in restricted settings, such as the standardized 
experimental setting used in most tests of status characteristics theory. Moreover, they note that 
BIPs can be triggered by many factors including valued personal characteristics such as 
friendliness or trustworthiness. Social identity theory offers clear evidence that membership in 
the in-group versus the out-group affects inferences about such qualities, and thus Assumption 2 
is a fairly well-grounded conjecture. 
 
Assumption 3. If a behavioral interchange pattern becomes salient, then actors form positive 
group status typification states for in-group members and negative group status typification 
states for out-group members.  
 
If the ordering of evaluations in BIPs favors the in-group, then group status typification states 
also should form in a manner consistent with group membership. This is based on Fisek et al.'s 
(1991:124) "burden of proof through status-typification states" assumption. 
 
The next assumption borrows the concept of abstract task ability from status characteristics 
theory. This refers to whether or not a person is presumed to be generally capable in task 
settings. 
 
 Assumption 4. If the actor forms positive group status typification states for in-group 
members and negative group status typification states for out-group members, then the actor 
forms positive abstract task ability expectations for in-group members and negative abstract 
task ability expectations for out-group members.  
 
For our purposes this means that in-group members' task contributions are more apt to produce 
positive task out-comes than are out-group members' task suggestions.  
 
The integration is completed using the following two assumptions, paraphrased from status 
characteristics theory: 
 
Assumption SCT 4 (Combining). If an actor has formed ability expectations, then s/he uses 
them to infer task competence for actors in the setting.  
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Assumption SCT 5 (Basic Expectation Assumption). The greater an actor's perceived 
competence, the higher his/her position in the group's OPPO. 
 
The experiment described below tests the key derivation (from Assumptions 2-5) that salient 
group membership is sufficient to determine relative status and influence in task-oriented groups. 
 
METHOD 
 
We employed a modified version of a standardized experimental setting used in most tests of 
status characteristics theory (Berger et al. 1977). This setting provides time-tested procedures for 
introducing status manipulations and measuring social influence.[6] Our modification consisted 
of a procedure for defining the subject's partner as either an in-group member or an out-group 
member. The key dependent variable was the rate at which each subject was influenced by his 
partner across a series of task trials. Although this setting limits the ability to operationally 
realize BIPs, as noted above, Webster and Hysom (1998) argue that BIPs can affect behavior 
even in restricted settings, such as the standardized experimental setting. Consequently, BIPs are 
not necessarily absent in this setting, but we would expect their role to be limited. 
 
Each subject was met by a research assistant upon arrival at the laboratory. Only males 
participated in order to control for gender effects. After completing a consent form, the subject 
was escorted to a small room containing a desk, chair, information form, computer monitor and 
keyboard. The assistant seated the subject, explained the use of the computer, and answered any 
questions before leaving the room. The subject initiated the instructions by mouse-clicking an 
icon on the computer screen. A roll-call created the impression that several others were 
participating in the experiment. Subjects were addressed only by room number, and each was 
asked to check-in by clicking a box on the computer screen. The program simulated the presence 
of others and so subjects never actually interacted with one another.  
 
The roll-call was followed by the group membership manipulation. Subjects were told that the 
experiment investigated the relationship between artistic preference and decision making. The 
program displayed a series of five screens, each containing one painting by Paul Klee and one by 
Wassily Kandinsky. The subject was asked to indicate his preference for one of the two paintings 
on each screen. Subjects were told that their responses would be analyzed to determine which 
artists' paintings they seemed to prefer. Each subject was then assigned to one of three 
conditions. For Conditions 1 and 2 each subject was informed that he was a member of the group 
that preferred the paintings of Klee, and that his randomly-assigned partner either was a member 
of the group preferring Klee (Condition 1, In-group Partner) or the group preferring Kandinsky 
(Condition 2, Out-group Partner).[7] This sentence was omitted for Condition 3 (Baseline). The 
computer then prompted subjects in Conditions 1 and 2 to complete a "group information 
worksheet" that had been placed on their desks. This form was designed to reinforce the salience 
of group membership or non-membership.  
 
After the group manipulation, the computer informed subjects that they would be working via 
the computer with their partner on a series of 25 "contrast sensitivity" tasks. The program 
informed each subject that it was important to consider the partner's suggestions in considering 
final answers. The contrast sensitivity task is used commonly in status characteristics research. It 
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requires subjects to judge which of two colors covers the greater area within a series of 
rectangles projected on the computer screen.[8] The task is ambiguous by design, ensuring equal 
competence for all subjects. For each trial the subject submits an initial response, receives 
information on the partner's initial response, and then renders a final response. The information 
received after the initial response is experimentally controlled so that the partner appears to 
disagree with the subject's initial response at a predetermined rate, typically 80% of the time. The 
dependent variable is the "probability of stay" or P(S) response: the proportion of trials in which, 
given disagreement with the partner's initial answer, the subject is not influenced by the partner 
and stays with his own initial response.  
 
Following the completion of the group task, the computer administered a questionnaire. Each 
subject used a scale ranging 0-100 to indicate his views on (1) the importance of obtaining 
correct answers, (2) attending to the partner's initial choices, (3) the partner's contrast sensitivity 
ability, (4) his similarity to the partner, (5) his confidence in his final answers, (6) his 
performance, and (7) the accuracy of his partner's initial choices. Finally, the research assistant 
returned to the room, debriefed the subject, explained all conditions and deceptions, and paid 
him $12.00 for participating in the experiment.  
 
Hypotheses 
 
A key derivation of the theory is that if group membership is salient, then an in-group member 
will be more influential than an out-group member, i.e., the in-group member's position in the 
observable power and prestige order of the task group will be higher than an out-group member's 
position. Assumption 4 asserts that the focal actor forms positive abstract task ability 
expectations for in-group members and negative expectations for out-group members. This 
implies that focal actors would perceive the ability level of an out-group member as lower than 
that of a "neutral" actor—a disidentification effect. Thus, subjects in the In-group Partner 
condition should be influenced more than subjects in the Baseline condition, who in turn should 
be influenced more than subjects in the Out-group Partner conditions. Strictly speaking, the 
baseline condition violates the scope conditions of our theory. The theory does not make 
predictions in settings where neither group membership nor status is salient. We included the 
baseline to lend insight into the strength of the group membership effect and whether a 
disidentification effect exists. In terms of probability of stay responses by condition, we predict  
 
Hypothesis 1:  P(S)In-group > P(S)Baseline > P(S)Out-group 
 
A second derivation from the theory states that if group membership is salient in a task setting, 
then the perceived quality of information and ability of others should be highest for in-group 
partners and lowest for out-group partners. The questionnaire asked subjects: “How much contrast 
sensitivity ability do you think your partner has?,” and "How much attention did you pay to your 
partner's initial choice?" If a subject believes his partner has more ability than another, then he is 
likely to think his partner is a better source of information than the other and is also likely to pay 
more attention to the partner's initial choices than if the partner is seen as a poor source of 
information. The derivation thus leads to the following hypothesis regarding the perceived 
quality of information received from the partner (Q):  
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Hypothesis 2:  QIn-group > QBaseline > QOut-group 
 
RESULTS 
 
Subjects 
 
Subjects were drawn from a pool of university students who volunteered in undergraduate 
classes to participate in experiments for pay. A trained assistant contacted subjects individually 
to schedule them for experimental sessions. In all, 98 subjects participated in the experiment. 
Hypotheses do not apply to subjects who fail to satisfy scope conditions, and so in order to 
ensure collective orientation and task orientation we established a strict criterion value of 35 for 
responses to the questionnaire items, "How important to you was it that your group obtained 
correct answers?" and "How much attention did you pay to your partner's initial choice?" 
Twenty-three subjects did not meet the criterion for one or both questions. Five more subjects 
were excluded from the analyses due to an error with the random assignment protocol. The post-
experiment debriefing led to the exclusion of four more subjects—three that were highly 
suspicious of experimental manipulations and one who misunderstood instructions. Finally, one 
subject was excluded due to an equipment malfunction. Thus, our analyses included 65 subjects. 
The excluded cases were quite evenly distributed across conditions and we have no reason to 
suspect that their exclusion introduced any biases. (See the Appendix for a statistical check.)   
 
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations for Key Measures 
 
Condition 
(N) 
In-group 
(22) 
Baseline 
(22) 
Out-group 
(21) 
Perceived Similarity 35.36 
(17.01) 
28.95 
(17.36) 
27.67 
(16.38) 
P(S) .561 
(.123) 
.632 
(.073) 
.633 
(.120) 
Attention to Partner's 
Choice 
84.00 
(13.98) 
71.09 
(16.51) 
62.71 
(16.92) 
Partner’s Ability 55.04 
(18.86) 
47.00 
(17.42) 
45.85 
(17.04) 
 
Manipulation Checks 
 
A questionnaire item was designed to measure the efficacy of the group membership 
manipulation: "How similar to you as a person would you say that your partner is?" The first 
data row of Table 1 displays means and variances for this variable. The means are in the 
predicted order by condition. Subjects perceived in-group members as more similar to 
themselves than unknown others, and unknown others as more similar than out-group members. 
An initial ANOVA F-test indicates differences between conditions were not significant, F(2,62) 
= 1.288, p = .283, ç
p
2  = .040. However, our theory allows only one of six possible orderings of 
conditions to support the hypothesis. To test for this predicted ordering, the p value is divided by 
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the number of possible orderings, giving the probability of obtaining the observed ordering of 
conditions by chance alone. By this so-called "one-sixth tail test" (Howell 1998:155; Wuensch 
2006), the overall test does achieve significance (p = .283/6 = .047). Planned contrasts suggest 
that differences in perceived similarity between the In-group and Out-group conditions were 
sufficiently robust.[9] However, means for the Baseline and Out-group did not differ 
significantly from one another. Implications for predicted influence effects are discussed below. 
 
Influence Effects 
 
The P(S) response is the behavioral measure of influence developed for status characteristic 
theory's standardized experimental setting (Berger et al.1977). Higher P(S) values indicate 
greater resistance to the influence of the partner's communicated initial choice. Hypothesis 1 
asserted that a subject is more influenced by an in-group member than by either an unknown 
other or by an out-group member, and that the unknown other is more influential than the out-
group member. The observed ordering of mean P(S) values in Table 1 confirmed this hypothesis. 
However, consistent with the non-significance of the perceived similarity measure noted above, 
the difference between the Baseline and Out-group conditions was negligible. We used non-
parametric significance tests for P(S) data. The Kruskal-Wallis test, which tests for differences 
between three or more groups, was significant, χ2 = 6.025, p = .049. The Mann-Whitney U test 
found significant differences for In-group Partner vs. Out-group Partner comparison, z = -
2.002, p = .045, and for In-group vs. Baseline, z = -2.210, p = .027.[10] Consistent with the 
results for our manipulation check, the Out-group vs. Baseline comparison was not significant. 
Support for hypothesis 1 is thus only partial [11]. We interpret this finding in our Discussion and 
Conclusions section below.  
 
Hypothesis 2 asserted that subjects would attend to in-group members' initial opinions more than 
to unknown others', and more to unknown others' initial suggestions than to out-group members'. 
This was tested using a post-task questionnaire item that asked subjects how much attention they 
paid to their partner's initial suggestion. As evident in the third data row of Table 1, the ordering 
of means was consistent with the hypothesis. ANOVA found a significant difference between 
conditions, F(2,62) = 9.89, p < 0.0001, ç
p
2  = .242. Planned contrast tests revealed significant 
differences between the In-group vs. Baseline, t(62) = 2.704, p = .005, and Baseline vs. Out-
group conditions, t(62) = 1.734, p = .044. Additionally, hypothesis 2 asserted that subjects would 
perceive in-group partners as more able than unknown others, and unknown others as more able 
than out-group members. This was tested using the using the questionnaire item that asked 
subjects for their assessments of their partners’ contrast sensitivity ability. The ordering of the 
fourth row of Table 1 is consistent with this prediction, but, ANOVA found no significant 
differences between conditions, F(2,62) = 1.72, p =.187. However, because the theory does not 
actually make predictions for baseline conditions, we conducted further analysis with a t-test 
comparing the in-group to the out-group condition. This test was significant t(62) = 1.67, p = 
.047 (one-tailed). 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Status characteristics theory and self categorization theory account successfully for influence 
patterns in task group settings, however they take different explanatory routes. Self 
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categorization theory focuses on disagreements with in-group members, status characteristics 
theory on performance expectations. Integrating elements of both theories opens an array of 
potential new applications without subverting either theory's basic assumptions.  
 
We tested our theoretical integration in a standardized experimental setting. The results 
supported a key derivation, demonstrating that the integration accounts for phenomena that 
neither theory alone addresses. Specifically, we observed that group membership affected social 
influence in the predicted fashion: Subjects were influenced more by in-group members than by 
out-group members. However, we did not observe a predicted disidentification effect by which 
out-group members would have been less influential than unknown others. These conclusions 
were substantiated by our questionnaire results. Subjects partnered with in-group members paid 
more attention to partners' suggestions than subjects in the other conditions, but differences 
between the Out-group and Baseline conditions were not significant.  
 
It would be premature to alter the theory until we can be more certain that the anomalous result is 
not an artifact of our experimental context, especially given that the group membership 
manipulation was not extremely robust. It is possible that the manipulation creating the various 
distinctions among conditions needs to be strengthened in order to create greater salience for 
subjects. Alternatively, the manipulation check simply may not have been sensitive enough to 
detect the effects of the manipulation. In fact, research on self categorization theory typically 
uses a much more elaborate set of queries (see Mullin and Hogg 1998; Grieve and Hogg 1999; 
Hogg 1992; Hogg and Sunderland 1991).  
 
If the anomaly stems from weakness in the group membership manipulation, then it is possible 
that a more realistic roll-call procedure using audio and video devices could produce effects. 
Switching from a between-subjects to a within-subjects design is another way to heighten the 
salience of group membership, i.e., each subject experiences at least one in-group partner and at 
least one out-group partner, thereby heightening the contrast between conditions. Some of our 
results do point to possible disidentification effects, such as the ordering of the means for the 
"attention paid to partner" item of the questionnaire. An important question for future 
examination is whether increased group salience will magnify this tendency.  
 
The group status typification state is another issue that should be investigated further in order to 
examine the potential utility of this concept. Such research ought to attempt to observe status 
typification states more directly using specific questions about partners as sources of 
information. Then if the phenomenon is found to exist, efforts must be made to see exactly how 
it is linked to task outcomes. Such an analysis, in conjunction with the graph-theoretic modeling 
used in status characteristics theory, would allow formal visualizations of the impact of group 
membership on status expectations and influence. Empirically informed theoretic structures 
would enable us to investigate the relative strength of the group membership effect in 
comparison to status characteristics, and to determine what this strength means in terms of 
influence calculations. In turn, this knowledge could be used to develop intervention strategies to 
attenuate the status disadvantages some actors must face due to group membership. For example, 
in a classroom setting, group membership could be used to counteract the interaction 
disadvantages that poorer students face (Ridgeway 1982). Knowing group membership's strength 
and whether it combines additively with status or whether it tends to cancel it out could be used 
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to create "minimal groups" that would serve to offset the status effects. The theory and findings 
from the present work are a crucial step in this direction.  
 
ENDNOTES 
 
[1] For examples, see Berger and Zelditch (2002), Burke, Owens, Serpe and Thoits (2003), 
Friedkin (1998), McClelland and Fararo (2006), Molm (1997), Willer (1999). 
 
[2] See Tajfel (1974, 1978, 1982); Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986); Turner (1982); Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell (1987). 
 
[3] See Berger, Cohen and Zelditch (1972), Berger, Fisek, Norman and Zelditch (1977), Berger 
and Zelditch (1985), Berger, Norman and Balkwell (1992), Webster and Foschi (1988). 
 
[4] See Turner (1991); Hogg and Turner (1987a,b); Abrams, Cochrane, Hogg and Turner (1986); 
van Kippenberg and Wilke (1992); Abrams et al. (1986); Kalkhoff and Barnum (2000). 
 
[5] Most of self categorization theory is highly informal, however Barnum (1997) has formalized 
key elements of social identity theory. 
 
[6] The computer program used in this setting was developed by Troyer (1997). Detailed 
information on the experimental procedures is available from the first author. 
 
[7] The experimental instructions were used to make subjects aware of the existence of two 
different groups in Condition 1,(in-group partner). The computer presented the following 
statement to the participants: “We have two groups of people here today, one group who prefers 
the paintings by Klee and one group who prefers the paintings by Kandinsky.” Subjects were 
assigned partners knowing he could either be an in-group member or an out-group member.  
 
[8] A common variant has subjects judging which of two rectangles has more of a particular 
color. 
 
[9] The In-group/Out-group contrast on the raw data yielded t(62) = 1.49, 1-tailed p = .07. Some 
outliers were evident upon inspection of the overall distribution of responses. After dropping the 
highest two responses and the lowest two responses from each condition, the contrast test yielded 
t(50) = 1.79, 1-tailed p = .04. We were satisfied in the strength of the effect for purposes of a 
manipulation check. 
 
[10] These results were corroborated in an ANOVA. Results indicate that the overall differences 
between conditions are significant: F = 3.81, p = 0.048 (2, 62 df.). When rank order is 
considered,  p drops to 0.024 (ANOVA p = 0.048 x 0.50). A planned contrast test between the 
in-group condition and the out-group condition was significant t(62)= -2.191, p =.016 (one tailed 
test), as was a test between the in-group and the baseline t(62) = 2.17, p = .017 (one tailed test). 
However, a non-orthogonal contrast between the out-group and baseline was not significant t(62) 
= .046, p = .963.    
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[11] We estimated a linear equation to test the effect of expectations on P(S), from a preliminary 
graph-theoretic structure. In this model, the focal actor (P) would develop the positive state of a 
BIP when interacting with an out-group member and the negative state of a BIP when working 
with an in-group member. A BIP would not develop in baseline conditions. P’s expectation 
advantage values are -.38534 in the in-group condition, .38534 in the out-group condition and 0 
in the baseline condition. The regression coefficient q = 0.09431, se =0.0423, t(61) = 2.22, p < 
.01 one-tailed test. This test does not provide a definitive assessment of the theorized BIP 
mechanism, but the results are consistent with it. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer 
for this suggestion.  
 
[12] As Kalkhoff (2002) points out, one problem with this approach is that the standard errors in 
the OLS equation will not be consistent. Following Kalkhoff (2002), we corrected this problem 
using a SAS/STAT macro that incorporates Greene's (1981) formula for the correct variance-
covariance matrix of OLS estimates. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Of the 21 subjects excluded for violations of scope conditions, seven were in the In-group 
Partner condition, six in the Baseline condition and eight in the Out-group Partner condition. 
Heckman (1979) argued that sample selection bias can occur when the statistical error 
component of the sample selection process is correlated with the error component of the 
statistical equations used to analyze the data. When these components are correlated, ordinary 
least squares estimates are inconsistent and biased. This may affect OLS estimators in laboratory 
settings where exclusion is conditional on a set of scope conditions.  
 
Heckman's (1979) method for identifying and correcting sample bias is applicable in our case. It 
first applies a probit model to assess the effects of inclusion vs. exclusion (coded 1 and 0, 
respectively) on the two scope condition questionnaire items. Then the dependent variable, P(S), 
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is regressed on two dummy variables created for the Out-group and Baseline conditions (In-
group being the omitted category) and the inverse Mill's ratio (also known as the hazard rate 
correction, λ) calculated from the first stage results.[12] Results from this analysis appear in 
Table 2. The uncorrected and corrected OLS results are similar. All significant coefficients in the 
uncorrected model remain so in the corrected model, the standard errors in each model are nearly 
identical, and the coefficient for the hazard rate correction is non-significant. Together, these 
findings strongly suggest that the experimental results are not biased by having excluded cases 
from the analysis on the basis of scope condition violations.  
 
Table 2. OLS Analyses of P(S) and Selection Bias 
 
Variable Uncorrected  
Coefficient 
Corrected 
Coefficient 
Intercept .5613 
(.022) 
.5548 
(.024) 
 
Hazard Rate λ __ .0465 
(.035) 
 
Out-group 
Dummy 
.0719* 
(.032) 
.0589* 
(.035) 
 
Baseline Dummy .0704* 
(.032) 
.0629* 
(.032) 
 
R-squared .09 .10 
Note: standard errors are in parenthesis.  
* p < 0.05, one-tailed t-test.  
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